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Abstract
As becomes apparent from the standard text books in industrial or-
ganization (cf. Tirole, 1988, The Theory of Industrial Organization), the
analysis of the eﬀects of uncertainty within this ﬁeld is yet underdevel-
oped. This paper shows that the new theory of strategic real options can
be used to ﬁll this ”empty hole”. Based on the work by Smets (1991) stan-
dard models are identiﬁed, and they are analyzed by applying a method
involving symmetric mixed strategies. As an illustration, extensions re-
garding asymmetry, technology adoption and decreasing uncertainty over
time are reviewed. Among others, it is found that the value of a high cost
ﬁrm can increase in its own cost. Furthermore, it is established to what
extent investments are delayed when technologial progress is anticipated,
and it is found that competition can be bad for welfare.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The main diﬀerence between ﬁnancial options and real options is that in most
cases real options are not exclusive. Exercising a given option by one party
results in the termination of corresponding options held by other parties. For
example, an option to open an outlet in an attractive location is alive only until
a competitive ﬁrm opens its own store there.
However, as it is now the real option theory mainly considers single decision
maker problems of ﬁrms operating in monopoly or perfect competition markets.
But capital budgeting decisions can be strongly inﬂuenced by existing as well
as potential competitors. The creation of the European Union and the growing
1internationalization has increased interdependencies among ﬁrms in European
industries. Former domestic market leaders now have to deal with competition.
The conclusion is that there is a strong need to consider a situation where
several ﬁrms have the option to invest in the same project. This brand new
topic requires a merge between game theory and real options.
At present, only a few contributions deal with the eﬀects of strategic in-
teractions on the option value of waiting associated with investments under
uncertainty (see Grenadier (2000) for a survey). One of the main reasons is
that the application of game theory to continuous-time models is not well de-
veloped and often quite tricky. However, due to the importance of studying
the topic of investment under uncertainty in an oligopolistic setting, it can be
expected that more publications will appear in the immediate future.
This paper provides an overview of the state of the art, where we mainly
concentrate on identical ﬁrms in a duopoly context. We begin by discussing two
standard models. One model is a new market model (Dixit/Pindyck (1996))
and the other one considers a framework where the ﬁrms can enlarge an existing
proﬁt ﬂow (Smets (1991)). Since ﬁrms are identical it seems natural to consider
symmetric strategies. However, it can be expected that coordination problems
arise in situations where investment is optimal only if the other ﬁrm refrains from
doing so. While discussing the standard models we apply an approach which
shows that imposing mixed strategies can deal with this coordination problem in
an economically meaningful way. This approach, being inspired by the determin-
istic analysis in Fudenberg/Tirole (1985), was developed in Huisman (2001) (see
also Huisman/Kort (2003)) and formalized in Thijssen/Huisman/Kort (2002b).
A similar attempt can be found in Boyer/Lasserre/Mariotti/Moreaux (2001).
We show that Smets (1991) and Dixit/Pindyck (1996) conclude wrongly when
they say that, in case it is only optimal for one ﬁrm to invest, joint investment
never occurs.
As an illustration of the applicability of this framework we proceed by re-
viewing some of our own work. The ﬁrst model incorporates asymmetry in the
investment cost function. Among other things, a surprising result is that the
value of the high cost ﬁrm can increase in its own investment cost. In the second
model ﬁrms take into account the occurrence of future technologies when decid-
ing about investment. A scenario is identiﬁed where this results in a game with
second mover advantages. Finally, the third model extends the existing real
option literature by studying a framework where over time information arrives
in the form of signals. This information reduces uncertainty. In analyzing a new
market model it is found that the mode of the game depends on the ﬁrst mover
advantage relative to the value of information free riding of the second mover.
In Section 2 we present the basic models, while in Section 3 some recent
literature is reviewed that makes use of this framework. Section 4 concludes.
22S t a n d a r d M o d e l s
The ﬁrst paper dealing with a multiple decision maker model in a real option
context is Smets (1991). He considers an international duopoly where both
ﬁrms can increase their revenue stream by investing. Like in Fudenberg/Tirole
(1985) two equilibria arise: a preemption equilibrium, where one of the ﬁrms
invests early, and a simultaneous one, where both ﬁrms delay their investment
considerably. A simpliﬁed version was discussed in Dixit/Pindyck (1996) in the
sense that the ﬁrms are not active before the investment is undertaken. The
resulting new market model only has the preemption equilibrium. In this section
our symmetric mixed strategy approach is applied to both models. Section
2.1 treats the new market model (Dixit/Pindyck (1996), for a more thorough
analysis see Thijssen/Huisman/Kort (2002b)), and the Smets (1991)-model is
discussed in Section 2.2 (see Huisman (2001) for a complete analysis).
2.1 New Market Model
This model considers an investment project with sunk costs I>0. After the
investment is made the ﬁrm can produce one unit of product at any point in time.
Since the number of ﬁrms is two, market supply is Q ∈ {0,1,2}. It is assumed
that the ﬁrms are risk neutral, value maximizing, discount with constant rate r,
and variable costs of production are absent. The market demand curve is subject
to shocks that follow a geometric Brownian motion process. In particular, it is
assumed that the unit output price is given by
Pt = YtD(Q), (1)
in which
dYt = µYtdt + σYtdω, (2)
Y0 = y, (3)
where y>0, 0 <µ<r ,σ > 0, and the dω’s are independently and identically
distributed according to a normal distribution with mean zero and variance dt.
Furthermore, D(Q) is a decreasing function, comprising the non-stochastic part
of the inverse demand curve.
Given the stochastic process (Yt)t≥0 we can deﬁne the payoﬀ functions for
the ﬁrms. If there is a ﬁrm that invests ﬁrst while the other ﬁrm does not, the
ﬁrm that moves ﬁrst is called the leader. When it invests at time t its discounted
proﬁt stream is given by L(Yt). The other ﬁrm is called the follower. When the
leader invests at time t the optimal investment strategy of the follower leads to
ad i s c o u n t e dp r o ﬁts t r e a mF (Yt). If both ﬁrms invest simultaneously at time t,
the discounted proﬁts t r e a mf o rb o t hﬁrms is given by M (Yt). In Figure 1 the
three value functions are plotted. If the leader invests at Y< Y F, the follower’s
value is maximized when the follower invests at YF. The follower’s proﬁt ﬂow
will be YD(2). Following familiar steps (cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1996)), we can
















Figure 1: Value functions in the standard new market model.
where β1 is given by
β1 =
1





Since ﬁrms are identical there seems to be no reason why one of these ﬁrms
should be given the leader role beforehand. The fact that ﬁrms are rational and
identical also implies that it is hard to establish coordination on a non-symmetric
equilibrium. Therefore, we concentrate on equilibria that are supported by sym-
metric strategies. We use the subgame perfect equilibrium concept for timing
games as formalized in Thijssen/Huisman/Kort (2002b). This approach extends
the perfect equilibrium concept of Fudenberg/Tirole (1985) to stochastic games.
It is argued there that in continuous time preemption games a closed loop strat-




is the probability that Firm i has invested in between [τ,t). The function ατ
i (t)
is the measure of the intensity of atoms in the interval [t,t + dt]. In other words
i tc a nb es a i dt h a tG determines when something happens, while α determines
what exactly happens in case of a coordination problem.
4To describe the equilibrium, ﬁrst deﬁne the preemption point
YP =m i n
Y
{Y | L(Y )=F (Y )},
see also Figure 1. This point is called preemption point because to the right
of this point the leader value, L(Yt), exceeds the follower value, F (Yt), and
this results in strategic behavior of the ﬁrms trying to preempt each other with
investing as will become apparent from the description below. The equilibrium
under consideration is therefore called a preemption equilibrium.
From Thijssen/Huisman/Kort (2002b) it is obtained that the equilibrium






0 if Yt <Y P
L(Yt)−M(Yt)
L(Yt)−2M(Yt)+F(Yt) if YP ≤ Yt <Y F








0 if Yt <Y P
L(Yt)−F(Yt)
L(Yt)−M(Yt) if YP ≤ Yt <Y F
1 if Yt ≥ YF
. (6)
From this result it is clear that three regions have to be distinguished. The
ﬁrst region is deﬁned by Yt ≥ YF. According to equation (6) the outcome ex-
hibits immediate joint investment. Here the unit output price is large enough
for both ﬁrms to enter the market.
In the second region it holds that YP ≤ Yt <Y F. Immediate joint investment
gives a payoﬀ M (Yt). this is not a Nash equilibrium since if one of the ﬁrms
deviates by waiting with investment until Yt = YF, it obtains the follower value
F (Yt) which exceeds M (Yt) as long as YP ≤ Yt <Y F, cf. Figure 1.
In case both ﬁrms refrain from investment and wait until Yt = YF, they get
the follower payoﬀ F (Yt). Again this is not a Nash equilibrium, because if one
of the ﬁrms deviates by investing this ﬁrm receives a payoﬀ L(Yt) which is more
than F (Yt) on this interval.
Since we restrict ourselves to symmetric strategies the only possibility left is
to apply mixed strategies. Denote the probability that Firm i invests by αi (t).
As already said the function αi (t) is the measure of the intensity of atoms in the
interval (t,t + dt]. It can be interpreted as the probability that ﬁrm i chooses
row 1 in the matrix game depicted in Figure 2.
Playing the game costs no time and if Firm i chooses row 2 and Firm j
column 2 the game is repeated. If necessary the game will be repeated inﬁnitely
often.
Since αi (αj) is the probability that Firm i(j) invests, they are the control
variables of both ﬁrms that need to be optimally determined. To do so, deﬁne
Vi as the value of Firm i, which is given by
Vi =m a x
αi














Figure 2: Matrix game.
Since Firm i invests with probability αi and Firm j with probability αj, the
probability that Firm i obtains the leader role, and thus receives L(Y ), is
αi [1 − αj]. Similarly, with probability [1 − αi]αj Firm i is the follower, αiαj is
the joint investment probability, and with probability [1 − αi][1− αj] nothing
happens and the game is repeated. After writing down the ﬁrst order conditions
for Firm i and Firm j, and imposing symmetric strategies, i.e. αi = αj = α, it
is obtained that
α =
L(Y ) − F (Y )
L(Y ) − M (Y )
. (8)
From Figure 1 we learn that M (Y ) <F(Y ) ≤ L(Y ) on the relevant Y -interval
[YP,Y F), so that we are sure that the probability α lies between zero and one.
From (8) it is obtained that, given the diﬀerence L(Y ) − M (Y ), the ﬁrm is
more eager to invest when the diﬀerence between the payoﬀs associated with
investing ﬁrst and second is large.
After substitution of α = αi = αj into (7), the value of Firm i can be
expressed as
Vi =
α[1 − α]L(Y )+[ 1− α]αF (Y )+α2M (Y )
2α − α2 . (9)
Of course, both ﬁr m sd on o tw a n tt oi n v e s ta tt h es a m et i m e ,b e c a u s ei t
leaves them with the lowest possible payoﬀ M (Y ). F r o m( 9 )i tc a nb ed e r i v e d




which naturally increases with α. We also see that, whenever α > 0 which is
in fact the case for Y ∈ (YP,Y F), the probability that the ﬁrms invest simulta-
neously is strictly positive. This is not in accordance with many contributions
in the literature. For instance, Smets (1991, p. 12) and Dixit/Pindyck (1996),
p. 313) state that ”if both players move simultaneously, each of them becomes
leader with probability one half and follower with probability one half”.





6Due to symmetry this is also the probability of ending up being the follower.
Since the probability of simultaneous investment increases with α, it follows
that the probability of being the ﬁrst investor decreases with α,w h i c hi sa t
ﬁrst sight a strange result. But it is not that unexpected, because if one ﬁrm
increases its probability to invest, the other ﬁrm does the same. This results
in a higher probability of investing jointly, which leaves less room for the equal
probabilities of being the ﬁrst investor.
In the third region it holds that Yt <Y P. From Figure 1 it can be concluded
that the follower value exceeds the leader value. Hence, investing ﬁrst is not
optimal so that both ﬁrms refrain from investing and wait until Y = YP. Then
t h es e c o n dr e g i o ni se n t e r e d ,a n di tc a nb eo b t a i n e df r o m( 8 )a n dt h ef a c tt h a t
L(YP)=F (YP), that α =0 . From (11) we get that the probability for a
ﬁrm to become leader is one half, and with the same probability this ﬁrm will
be the second investor. Furthermore, from (10) it can be concluded that the
probability of simultaneous investment at YP is zero. All this implies that one
of the ﬁrms will invest at YP and the other one, being the follower, will wait
with investment until Y equals YF. Since the values of leader and follower are
equal at YP, the ﬁrms have equal preferences of becoming the ﬁrst or the second
investor in this case. This is called rent equalization.
2.2 Existing Market Model
Contrary to the previous section, here two identical ﬁrms are already active on
the market. They have the possibility to make an irreversible investment which
results in a higher output price. A possible interpretation is that both ﬁrms
have the possibility to adopt a new technology which after adoption increases
the quality of the ﬁrm’s product. The resulting model is similar to the one of
the previous section with the exception that expression (1) is replaced by
Pt = YtDNiNj,
where, for k ∈ {i,j} :
Nk =
½
0 if ﬁrm k has not invested,
1 if ﬁrm k has invested.
Keeping in mind that (i) the investment increases the unit output price and (ii)
the demand for the ﬁrm’s product is higher if the competitor still produces the
old quality products (thus not having invested (yet)), the following restrictions
on DNiNj are implied:
D10 >D 11 >D 00 >D 01. (12)
Further we assume that there is a ﬁrst mover advantage to investment:
D10 − D11 >D 11 − D01.
As expected, the resulting equilibria of this game also depend here on the
payoﬀs of the leader (L), the follower (F) and immediate joint investment (M),
7but, in addition to the analysis of the previous section, the equilibria also depend
on the optimal joint investment payoﬀ, which we denote by J. In the latter case







When ﬁrms invest simultaneously they increase their proﬁt ﬂow from YD 00 to
YD 11. For the follower it holds that investing changes the proﬁt ﬂow from YD 01







Since D01 <D 00 (cf. (12)), before the investment takes place the follower’s
proﬁts are lower than those of the simultaneous investors. Therefore, for the
follower the incentive to invest is greater which explains why YF <Y J.
It is important to note that if in the new market model the ﬁrms decide to
invest simultaneously, their optimal threshold will be the same as the one of the
follower. Thus it equals YF, as deﬁned by (4). This is the case because for the
follower as well as for simultaneous investment it holds that a proﬁt ﬂow of zero
is replaced by a proﬁt ﬂow of YD(2). Consequently, in the new market model
the follower payoﬀ curve coincides with the payoﬀ curve of optimal simultaneous
investment, and for this reason the latter plays no role in the determination of
the new market equilibrium.
If we again choose for symmetric strategies two cases can be distinguished in
the existing market model. Depending on whether or not the optimal joint in-
vestment curve lies above the leader curve on the interval [YP,Y F), one of them
will occur. In the ﬁrst case the leader curve lies above the optimal joint invest-
ment curve for some Y ∈ [YP,Y F), see Figure 2. Here the equilibrium strategy
of Firm i is also given by (5) and (6). For a description of this preemption
equilibrium we therefore refer to the previous section.
In the second case the optimal joint investment curve lies above the leader
curve on the interval [YP,Y F), as can be seen in Figure 3. Besides the still exist-
ing preemption equilibrium, there exists a continuum of simultaneous investment
equilibria from which simultaneous investment at Y = YJ Pareto dominates all
other equilibria including the preemption equilibrium. The Pareto dominant




0 if Yt ≤ YJ






0 if Yt ≤ YJ
1 if Yt >Y J
.






























Figure 3: First Case: Preemption equilibrium in the standard existing market
model.
In this Pareto dominant equilibrium the ﬁrms tacitly collude by refraining from
investment until Y becomes that large that it equals YJ, which is beneﬁcial
to both of them. Therefore, in Boyer/Lasserre/Mariotti/Moreaux (2001) this
equilibrium is called a tacit collusion equilibrium. Note that in Figure 3 this
simultaneous equilibrium does not exist for Y suﬃciently small, since at the
moment that Y is such that L(Y ) >J(Y ), Firm i can gain by deviating in the
form of investing immediately.
Thijssen (2003) shows that the Pareto dominant equilibrium is also risk
dominant, which makes selection of the Pareto dominant equilibrium more likely
than selection of the preemption equilibrium.
Now the question remains under which scenario which case occurs. In Huis-
man (2001) it is proved that, no matter the degree of uncertainty, the equilibrium
is always of the preemption type if D10 is large enough, i.e. if the incentives to
become leader are large enough.
3E x t e n s i o n s
This section treats three direct extensions to the standard models of Section
2. In Section 3.1 we incorporate some asymmetry in the sense that one of
the ﬁrms can invest in a cheaper way than the other one (see Pawlina/Kort







































Figure 4: Second Case: Tacit collusion equilibrium in the standard existing
market model.
(2001a) for a more thorough analysis). Section 3.2 considers ﬁrm investment
behavior in a scenario where with some probability a better technology will
become available in the future. This technology adoption problem is analyzed
in depth in Huisman/Kort (2000). Finally in Section 3.3, which summarizes
Thijssen (2002), another type of uncertainty is considered, namely uncertainty
that reduces because of information that becomes available over time.
3.1 Asymmetric Firms
The asymmetric model is a direct extension to the standard existing market
model presented in Section 2.2 (see Huisman (2001) for incorporating asym-
metry in a new market model). Also here we analyze the situation where two
ﬁrms have an opportunity to invest in a proﬁt enhancing investment project,
but the diﬀerence is that they face diﬀerent (eﬀective) investment costs. Sources
of potential costs asymmetry are, for instance, access to capital markets, orga-
nizational ﬂexibility, and regulation.
For the model we can thus refer to Section 2.2 with the exception of the
irreversible investment cost. We now have a low cost ﬁrm, say Firm 1,h a v i n g
investment cost I, and a high cost Firm 2 with investment cost κI, where
κ ∈ [1,∞).
Contrary to the model of Section 2.2, now there are three types of equilibria
that can occur. The ﬁrst type of equilibrium is the preemption equilibrium.I t
occurs in the situation in which both ﬁrms have an incentive to become the
10leader, i.e. when the cost disadvantage of Firm 2 is relatively small. Therefore,
Firm 1 has to take into account the fact that Firm 2 will aim at preempting
Firm 1 as soon as a certain threshold is reached. This threshold, denoted by
Y P
21, is the lowest realization of the process Yt for which the leader and follower
curve of Firm 2 are equal. As a consequence, when the initial value of Y is














I (r − µ)
D10 − D00
.
Firm 2 invests at the follower threshold Y F
2 . The corresponding ﬁgure is quali-
tatively similar to Figure 2.
The second type of equilibrium is the sequential equilibrium. This one occurs
when Firm 2 has no incentive to become the leader, thus when the follower curve
of Firm 2 always lies above the leader curve. Then Firm 1 simply maximizes
the value of the investment opportunity, which, provided that the initial level
of Y is suﬃciently low, always leads to investment at the optimal threshold
Y L
1 . In other words, Firm 1 acts as if it has exclusive rights to invest in a
proﬁt enhancing project but, of course, Firm 2’s investment still aﬀects Firm
1’s payoﬀ. As in the previous case, Firm 2 invests at its follower threshold
Y F
2 . Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs associated with the sequential
investment equilibrium.
The last type of equilibrium is the simultaneous equilibrium. The diﬀerence
with the simultaneous equilibrium in Section 2.2 is that here the optimal joint
investment thresholds diﬀer for the ﬁrms. Since the optimal threshold of Firm 1
is lower than that of Firm 2, the ﬁrms will jointly invest at that threshold. The
corresponding ﬁgures are qualitatively similar as Figure 4, to which the reader
is referred.
An important question of course is which equilibrium when occurs. It turns
out that two elements are crucial: the (relative) ﬁrst mover advantage, D10/D11,
and the investment cost asymmetry, κ. Figure 6 depicts the investment strategies
as a function of these two variables. When the investment cost asymmetry is
relatively small and there is no signiﬁcant ﬁrst mover advantage, the ﬁrms invest
jointly. When the ﬁrst mover advantage becomes signiﬁcant, Firm 1 prefers
being the leader to investing simultaneously, which results in the preemption
equilibrium. Finally, if the asymmetry between the ﬁr m si ss i g n i ﬁcant, the
ﬁrms invest sequentially.































Figure 5: Firm 1’s value functions when the resulting equilibrium is of the
sequential type.































Figure 6: Firm 2’s value functions when the resulting equilibrium is of the
sequential type.















Figure 7: Regions of sequential, preemptive and joint investment equilibria
for the set of parameter values: r =0 .05, µ =0 .015, σ =0 .1, D00 =0 .5,
D01 =0 .25,a n dD11 =1 .
Interesting observations can be made if the values of the ﬁrms are depicted
as a function of the asymmetry parameter κ; see Figure 8. Here the parameter
v a l u e sa r ec h o s e ni ns u c haw a yt h a tf o rd i ﬀerent values of the cost asymmetry
parameter all three types of equilibria are possible (cf. Figure 7).
The ﬁrst interesting observation is that in the region where the preemption
equilibrium prevails, the value of Firm 2 is increasing in its own investment cost.
This surprising result is caused by the fact that increasing κ makes Firm 2 a
’weaker’ competitor. This implies that the preemption threat of Firm 2 declines
in the investment cost asymmetry, so that Firm 1 will invest later. This is
beneﬁcial for the cash ﬂow of Firm 2 since, due to the fact that D00 >D 10,
Firm 2 can enjoy a higher cash ﬂow for a longer period. In this case the non-
strategic, i.e. increasing investment cost for Firm 2, and strategic eﬀects work
in the opposite direction and the latter eﬀect dominates.
The second counterintuitive observation is that at κ∗∗ the value of Firm 1
jumps downward if the investment cost of the other ﬁrm is increased marginally.
The reason is that this increase makes sequential investment for Firm 1 more
attractive because of the increasing Firm 2’s follower threshold. However, Firm
2 anticipates this and is willing to invest an instant before Firm 1 does. Again,
Firm 1 reacts on this and this preemption mechanism leads to a, from the
perspective of value maximization, too early investment of Firm 1.




























Sim.eq. Pre.eq. Sequential eq.
Figure 8: The value of Firm i (Vi) corresponding to the regions of the sequential,
preemptive and joint investment equilibria for the set of parameter values: r =
0.05, µ =0 .015, σ =0 .1, D00 =0 .5, D01 =0 .25, D10 =1 .33, D11 =1 , I =1 0 0 ,
and Y =4 .
3.2 Technology Adoption
The model extends the new market model of Section 2.1. At the beginning of
the game, entering the market means producing with an existing technology 1.
However, the decision to invest in technology 1 will be inﬂuenced by technolog-
ical progress. Adopting technology 1 would have been a bad decision if a little
later a much better technology becomes available. In the model technological
progress is included as follows. At the stochastic time T a new and better tech-
nology 2 becomes available for the ﬁrms. Time T is distributed according to
an exponential distribution with mean 1/λ, so that the arrival of technology 2
follows a Poisson process with parameter λ.
It is assumed that ﬁrms can invest only once and that the investment costs
of both technologies are equal to I. Concerning the proﬁt ﬂow of Firm i we
replace expression (1) by
πit = YtDNiNj,
where Nk denotes the technology that ﬁrm k (∈ {i,j}) is using. Hence, Nk ∈
{0,1,2}, where 0 means that the ﬁrm is not active.
We make the following assumptions on the D’s. First, a ﬁrm makes the
highest amount of proﬁts with a given technology if the other ﬁrm is not active
(monopoly). It also holds that, given its own technology, proﬁts are lowest
when the other ﬁrm is a strong competitor, thus producing with the eﬃcient
technology 2. Second, given the technology of the competitor, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts
are higher when it produces with the modern technology 2. In this way the
following inequalities are obtained:
14D20 >D 21 >D 22
∨∨∨
D10 >D 11 >D 12
.
As can be expected, the outcome of the game heavily depends on the arrival









then the probability of the arrival of a new technology is that low that the type of
the resulting equilibrium is the same as in Section 2.1. Both ﬁrms are expected
to invest in technology 1. But an increase of λ leads to a higher threshold value.
Therefore it can be concluded that the probability that both leader and follower
will invest in technology 1 decreases with λ. This is the case since, if it happens
that technology 2 arrives before (one of) the ﬁrms have invested, they (it) will
invest in technology 2 instead.
The ”Section 2.1 solution”, but then with respect to investing in technology










Here the probability that the new technology will become available soon is that
high that investing in the current technology is not considered. The ﬁrms wait
for the arrival of the new technology after which the preemption game of Section
2.1 is played.











the outcome is also a preemption equilibrium, but now the leader will invest in
technology 1 and the follower in technology 2. As before the leader’s adoption
of technology 1 is conditional on technology 2 not arriving before the investment
timing of the leader, and the probability that the leader will invest in technology
1 decreases with λ.




3). Also here the leader will invest in
technology 1 and the follower in technology 2, but the diﬀerence with the previ-
ous case is that now the arrival rate of the second technology is that high that
the value of the follower is higher. The leader has the advantage of monopoly
proﬁts until the time that the follower invests in technology 2, but the disad-
vantage of producing with a less eﬃcient technology after this date. Apparently
here this disadvantage outweighs the monopoly proﬁts.
A timing game with a higher payoﬀ of the follower is called a war of attrition.
In this particular case it can be shown that there does not exist a symmetric
equilibrium. There are two asymmetric equilibria, where in each of them a
diﬀerent ﬁrm has the leader role. Here neither ﬁrm would like to be the ﬁrst
15investor, but if they both keep on waiting, their payoﬀ will be even less than
the payoﬀ of the one that decides immediately to invest ﬁrst.
3.3 Uncertainty Being Reduced over Time
The real option literature mainly considers intrinsic uncertainty that will al-
ways exist regardless of the ﬁrm having invested or not. This is the kind of
uncertainty we dealt with in the paper until now. However, there exists also
another kind of uncertainty, which is uncertainty that reduces because of in-
formation that becomes available over time. A key feature of the latter kind
of uncertainty is that the information is imperfect. For example, consider the
introduction of a new communication technology by a telecom ﬁrm. There will
always be uncertainty about the demand for the new service, depending on e.g.
the business cycle, the unemployment rate and so on. On the other hand, there
is uncertainty about the level of structural demand for the new service. Due to
marketing research the ﬁrm gains more insight about structural demand, which
decreases uncertainty. Since a marketing survey consists of a sample and not
the entire population, the signals that it provides on the proﬁtability of the
investment are imperfect.
The model treated in this section deals with the kind of uncertainty that
reduces over time due to the arrival of new information. Consider two identical
ﬁrms that face the choice of investing in a certain project. The project can
be either good (denoted by H), leading to high revenues, UH
L for the leader,
UH
F <U H







in the case of simultaneous
investment, or bad (denoted by L), leading to no revenue. As an example we
can think of a duopoly game of quantity competition. Then in case the project is
good the leader captures a Stackelberg advantage, and simultaneous investment
implies a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The sunk costs involved in investing in the
project are given by I.
After investment has taken place by at least one ﬁrm the state of the project
becomes immediately known to both ﬁrms. Hence, this creates a second mover
advantage. If the ﬁrms do not invest simultaneously, the follower decides on
investing immediately after the true state of the project is revealed.
When the ﬁrms receive the option to invest, they have a prior belief about the
investment project being good or bad. The ex ante probability of high revenues
is p0. Occasionally the ﬁrms receive a signal indicating the project to be good (an
h-signal) or bad (an l-signal). The probabilities with which these signals occur
depend on the true state of the project. To model the imperfectness of signals,
it is assumed that a correct signal always occurs with probability 1/2 < λ < 1,
see Table 1 (note that the signal is uninformative if λ =1 /2). In this table the
ﬁrst row (column) lists the probabilities in case of a good project (good signal)
a n dt h es e c o n dr o w( c o l u m n )i nc a s eo fab a dp r o j e c t( b a ds i g n a l ) .
16hl
H λ 1 − λ
L 1 − λλ
Table 1: Probability of a signal indicating a good or bad project, given
the true state of the project.
The signals’ arrivals are modelled via a Poisson process with parameter
µ.Both ﬁrms have an identical prior belief p0 ∈ [0,1] in the project being good
that is common knowledge. Let g and b be the number of h-signals and l-signals,







p0 [1 − λ]
g−b.








The follower only invests in case of a good project. Therefore, if the leader
invests when the belief in a good project equals p,t h eex ante expected payoﬀ











Beforehand it is not clear whether this is a game of ﬁrst mover or second mover
advantages. If the Stackelberg advantage, i.e. UH
L − UH
F , is suﬃciently large,
the ﬁrms prefer to be the ﬁrst investor and a preemption game results. On the
other hand the follower is able to free ride on the investment decision taken by
the leader since immediately after this investment all uncertainty is resolved.
Then by refraining from investment the follower does not incur any losses in
case the project turns out to be bad. If the value of this information spillover
exceeds the Stackelberg advantage a war of attrition results. Thijssen (2002)










β1 [r + µ][r + µ[1 − λ]] − µλ[1 − λ][r + µ[1 + β1 − λ]]














− 4λ[1 − λ].
If the inequality in (15) is reversed, the game is a second mover game.
In case (15) holds the usual preemption game results. The analysis of this
game is qualitatively similar to what we have seen in Section 2. On the other
hand, when the game is a second mover game, ﬁrms eventually face the for
these games usual dilemma that by investing immediately the leader value is
obtained which is below the follower value, while waiting is bad for both ﬁrms
if the other ﬁrm also waits. In this case Thijssen (2002) ﬁnds a mixed strategy
equilibrium where the investment probability is a function of the diﬀerence
between the number of good and bad signals. During the time where this war
of attrition goes on it happens with positive probability that both ﬁrms refrain
from investment. It can then be the case that so many bad signals arrive that
the belief in a good project becomes so low that the war of attrition is ended
and that no ﬁrm invests for the time being. On the other hand, it can happen
that so many positive signals in excess of bad signal arrive that at some time the
Stackelberg advantage starts to exceed the value of the information spillover.
This then implies that the war of attrition turns into a preemption game.
In Thijssen (2002) also some welfare results are reported. From the in-
dustrial organization literature it is known that a monopoly is bad for social
welfare. Indeed, in the framework under consideration it is possible to ﬁnd
examples where a duopoly does better than a monopoly in terms of ex ante
expected total surplus. However, within a duopoly it is also possible that in the
case of a preemption equilibrium the ﬁrst investor is tempted by the Stackelberg
advantage to undertake the investment too soon from a social welfare perspec-
tive, i.e. when the environment is too risky. Moreover, there are two investing
ﬁrms so that sunk costs are higher. As a result it happens that welfare is lower
than in the monopoly case.
4E p i l o g u e
Besides our own extensions presented in Section 3, the framework being pre-
sented in Section 2 is used for many diﬀerent applications. Grenadier (1996)
applies it to the real estate market, Weeds (2002) and Miltersen/Schwartz (2002)
study R&D investments, Pennings (2002) and Pawlina/Kort (2002) analyze the
product quality choice, Mason/Weeds (2002) study merger policy and entry,
Boyer/Lasserre/Mariotti/Moreaux (2001) look at incremental indivisible capac-
ity investments, Lambregt (2001), Morellec (2001) and Pawlina (2002) take into
account debt ﬁnancing, Nielsen (2002) and Mason/Weeds (2001) analyze the ef-
fects of positive externalities, Lambrecht/Perraudin (2003) consider incomplete
information, Pawlina/Kort (2001b) explicitly model demand uncertainty, while
Sparla (2002) considers the decision to close down.
A p p l i c a t i o no fo u rm e t h o dt ot h es t a n d a r dm o d e l si nS e c t i o n2s h o w e dt h a t
18mixed strategy equilibria can be handled in a very tractable fashion. Neverthe-
less, in the literature the prevailing method is to rule out simultaneous exercise
beforehand (besides our own work, an exception is Boyer/Lasserre/Mariotti/Moreaux
(2001)). This is either done by (i) assumption or by (ii) avoiding cases where
suboptimal simultaneous investment can occur. Examples of (i) are, for in-
stance, Grenadier (1996, pp. 1656-1657) who assumes that ”if each tries to
build ﬁrst, one will randomly (i.e. through the toss of a coin) win the race”, or
Dutta/Lach/Rustichini (1995, p. 568) where it is assumed that ”If both i and
j attempt to enter at any period t, then only one of them succeeds in doing so”
(for a similar argument, see Nielsen (2002)). Examples of (ii) are Weeds (2002)
who in a new market model assumes that the initial value lies below the pre-
emption point, so that sequential investment is the only equilibrium outcome
(cf. Section 2), or Pennings (2002), Mason/Weeds (2002) and Pawlina/Kort
(2002), where the leader and follower roles are exogenously assigned.
Overall, with this contribution we attempted to show that the strategic real
option framework is a suitable tool to extend the industrial organization litera-
ture in a dynamic stochastic direction. By reviewing some existing research in
this ﬁeld, this paper proves that the interplay of game theory and real option
valuation is a fascinating area that can generate economic results being signif-
icantly diﬀerent from what is known from the existing industrial organization
literature.
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